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Experimental investigations of the neural substrate of consciousness typically take one of two 
paths, studying (1) contents or (2) levels of consciousness. It seems obvious to most that these 
two “paths” are interrelated, yet much less obvious how. This paper gives one suggestion to 
grasp the interrelation, arguing that conscious levels are determined by conscious contents in 
a very specific way. It follows from the argument that conscious contents are so-called natural 
kinds, whereas conscious levels are not.
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not have access to such objective methods. To arrive at such an asso-
ciation, one would have to conduct several experiments in order to 
 correlate a physical event with consciousness – using introspecting 
experimental participants. Consequently, this method would not 
be independent of introspection but carry with it the strengths, 
weaknesses and limitations held by introspection, as the physi-
cal event would relate to no more and no less than its subjective 
counterpart of the correlation.
Assuming that we necessarily come to know about our own 
conscious experiences by way of introspection, we would also be 
inclined to believe that the differentiation between, say, different 
contents of consciousness happens in the same act of introspec-
tion. If a neuroscientist aims to find the neural correlates of the 
conscious experience of being happy, her experiments might con-
trast measures of brain activity in subjects reporting experiences 
of happiness with measures of activity when reporting experiences 
of other emotions. However, she may also decide that “happiness” 
in itself comprises several different emotions. By introspection, 
her own or her subjects’, she may have increased insight into dif-
ferent appearances of happiness, and she may target these differ-
ences in new experiments. In this way, theories of neural correlates 
to different subjective states are shaped by introspection in the 
scientific process.
In the two “domains” of research, studying contents and levels of 
consciousness, there seems to be different answers to the question 
whether consciousness is gradual or “all-or-none.” Several recent 
experiments give empirical support to the idea that consciousness 
is gradual (e.g., Kouider et al., 2010). Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004) 
have asked subjects directly about the clearness of their visual expe-
riences and have repeatedly found (Overgaard et al., 2004, 2008) 
that they tend to report experiences as being graded rather than 
“all-or-none.” Given the assumptions above that knowledge about 
consciousness is based on introspective access, it would be a better 
procedure to trust subjective reports.
It is commonly agreed, and commonly mentioned in papers 
like this one, that consciousness yet has no widely accepted 
 definition. Operationally, however, most seem to agree that a 
distinction between the contents of consciousness and an overall 
level of  consciousness makes sense (Hohwy, 2009). Whereas 
typical examples of contents of consciousness include “the taste 
of coffee,” “feelings of pain,” or “the experience of redness,” typi-
cal examples of levels of consciousness are coma or the vegeta-
tive state, sleep, or drug abuse. In the empirical literature, the 
investigation of consciousness often amounts to a study of neu-
ral correlates of consciousness. Thus, the distinction between 
the two “types” or “aspects” of consciousness just mentioned, 
is operationalized as a search for two “types” of neural cor-
relates (or NCCs) – as two interrelated yet independent areas 
of research. In spite of distinctions, researchers preoccupied 
with any of the two “types” typically agree on one crucial thing: 
Seemingly, we get to know that we are conscious, and that there 
is anything such as consciousness in the first place, by way of 
introspection. For example, Naccache (2006, p. 1396) states 
that “consciousness is univocally probed in humans through 
the subject’s report of his or her own mental states.” This paper 
is about the meaning of the term “level of consciousness” and 
its relation to contents.
Introspection has been defined as a directing of attention 
toward one’s own experience, different from directing it toward 
external objects (Overgaard and Sørensen, 2004; Overgaard et al., 
2006). Whereas one may disagree on the exact wording of such a 
definition, it is a wide-spread understanding that there is no inde-
pendent objective method by way of which we have access to the 
contents of consciousness. Introspective (or, at least, subjective) 
access seems to be the single method by which we may conduct 
empirical consciousness research. Were we, someday, to find one 
particular physical event so strongly associated with consciousness 
that the latter never would appear without the first, we would still 
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of course claim to be conscious of more than the patient. Yet, could 
you, as a person, claim to be more conscious that the patient? We 
believe not. Levels of consciousness seem tied to the “clearness” or 
“vividness” of contents. If you, close to sleep or in a hypnotic state, 
experience everything more blurry and vague, without the kind of 
clarity known from full wakefulness, the notion of degraded levels 
of consciousness seems applicable.
With regards to the contents of consciousness, subjects seem able 
to distinguish between different degrees over time in a consistent 
manner. According to PAS, subjects tend to agree that conscious 
perception can be subdivided in four degrees as shown in Table 1: 
As either fully conscious, two degrees of “degraded” consciousness, 
or not conscious at all.
With regards to levels of consciousness, things are, again, more 
tricky. It is here much less obvious how to distinguish between 
different degrees, in spite of the reference to contents, as you at 
any given level of consciousness (except, of course, in its total 
absence) may experience a large number of different contents. For 
instance, if one at the same time entertained 26 degraded contents 
and 3 fully conscious ones, would that person be said to be in a 
degraded level?
In the study of levels of consciousness, there is much less disa-
greement. Here, three distinct “stages” of degraded consciousness 
have been described – coma, the vegetative state (VS), and the 
minimal conscious state (MCS). Interestingly, the differentiation 
between the stages is based on behavioral criteria. VS patients are 
generally thought to differ from comatose patients as VS patients 
can be aroused, yet both groups are believed to be fully uncon-
scious (Schiff, 2005). MCS patients, however, are believed to have 
“some” or “fluctuating” consciousness (Machado and Korein, 
2009). Other patients with severe brain injury who, however, are 
not in MCS, are typically believed to be “more conscious,” yet in 
some cases “less conscious” than healthy people. Consciousness is 
thus considered gradual and not necessarily stable. Here, however, 
we have no introspective evidence to support this widely accepted 
idea. Given our previous assumption that introspection is the sine 
qua non to know about the presence, absence or character of a 
given state of consciousness, and, furthermore, since the idea that 
conscious contents may be degraded derives from and is defended 
by introspection, there is a need to study introspection in this 
context as well.
Imagining a degraded level of consciousness seems however 
immensely more difficult than imagining degraded content of 
consciousness. For instance, when imagining being in VS or just 
trying to remember what it is like being nearly asleep, all suggestions 
seem to amount to a changed, or degraded, content of conscious-
ness. Considering the above mentioned point of departure that 
knowledge about consciousness derives from introspection, this is 
in and of itself a problem for the conception of the study of levels 
of consciousness as an independent area of research, distinct from 
the study of contents of consciousness.
How could we make sense of “degraded levels of consciousness”? 
One possible conception would be that a subject in a degraded 
level of consciousness has fewer possible contents than subjects in 
a less degraded level. This, however, seems not to be the way, the 
concept is intended to work. Say you were to decide whether you 
or a severely brain injured patient is more conscious1. In principle, 
you could try and “count” how many experiences each of you could 
have, yet this seems futile, and, according to the here presented view, 
beside the point. Instead, it would be important to know what the 
experienced content is like to each of you. Were the patient only able 
to entertain very “basic” experiences such as hunger, thirst or pain, 
yet had these experiences just as clear and vividly as you, you could 
Table 2 | The relationship between categories of conscious contents and conscious levels.
Conscious contents Introspection-based definition Conscious level
1 Clear experience Non-ambiguous experience of the stimulus. No doubt in one’s report 1 Fully conscious
2 Almost clear experience Ambiguous experience of the stimulus. Some stimulus aspects are experienced 2 Almost fully conscious 
 more vividly than others. A feeling of almost being certain about one’s report
3 Weak glimpse A feeling that something has been shown. Not characterized by any content,  3 Barely conscious 
 and this cannot be specified any further
4 No experience No impression of the stimulus. All reports are seen as mere guesses 4 Fully unconscious
Table 1 | The response categories, created by participants in the Ramsøy 
and Overgaard (2004) experiment. The figures below intend to illustrate 
how the categories refer to a still “less clear” image. According to the 
subjects’ own reports, and consistent with the behavioral results, a “lower 
degree” of conscious content is experienced as being overall more “blurry” 
and/or vague (e.g., Overgaard et al., 2008).
Conscious contents Introspection-based definition
1 Clear experience Non-ambiguous experience of the stimulus. 
 No doubt in one’s report
2 Almost clear experience Ambiguous experience of the stimulus.  
 Some stimulus aspects are experienced 
 more vividly than others. A feeling of 
 almost being certain about one’s report
3 Weak glimpse A feeling that something has been shown. 
 Not characterized by any content, and this 
 cannot be specified any further
4 No experience No impression of the stimulus. 
 All reports are seen as mere guesses
    
1This is just an example to illustrate the point. Obviously, the argument could have 
been made with other species, infants, etc.
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Another consequence, equally controversial, would be that 
conscious level should be determined using subjective rather 
than behavioral measures. Whereas this is obviously difficult 
in non-communicating subjects, some recent experiments 
have collected evidence with the purpose of making argu-
ments about the presence of conscious experiences in VS 
patients (Owen et al., 2006). Furthermore, increased insight 
into neural  substrates and mechanisms involved in conscious 
content, would  theoretically make it possible to investigate 
the presence of conscious experiences in non-communicating 
subjects indirectly.
In conclusion, we have here argued that research in conscious 
levels and contents cannot be carried out separately as conclusions 
about the level depend in a very direct way on conclusions about 
content. Furthermore, we have put forward the view, as a conse-
quence of the line of argumentation, that behavioral methods are 
of no greater value to determine conscious level than to determine 
conscious contents.
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In order to be consistent with the above line of reasoning, one 
should conclude that this is not the case. If the number of contents 
has no role in the categorization of or distinction between levels, 
clearly, it cannot be the factor by which to decide whether a given 
individual is conscious at a specific level.
A more obvious and consistent option would be to argue that the 
“most clearly” experienced contents determines the present level of 
consciousness. In this way, a VS patient unable to experience most 
events consciously, with a few degraded experiences, but with a pre-
served ability to experience, say, pain as clearly as any healthy subject, 
this patient would be conceived of as being fully conscious. In the same 
way (and assuming that PAS is a reasonable way to grade conscious 
content), an individual experiencing a “weak glimpse” as the most 
clear experience, would be conscious at a corresponding level 3.
As shown in Table 2, the consequence of this logic is a strong 
and necessary tie between conscious levels and conscious contents, 
in such a way that the first is determined by the latter. Furthermore, 
given our premises that consciousness is a subjective phenomenon, 
and that our only knowledge of its existence is this subjective knowl-
edge, we have “direct introspective evidence” about contents of con-
sciousness – but no direct evidence about levels of consciousness. 
The level, as argued, is determined solely on the basis of contents.
